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PENALTY CLAUSES – WHAT HAS CHANGED? 
Bruno Zeller* 
ABSTRACT  
Building on two seminal cases that consider the character of 
penalty clauses, Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd from Australia and Cavendish Square Holding BV v. 
Talal El Makdessi from England, this Article sheds a new light on 
the treatment of fixed sums and argues that the view on whether 
penalty clauses are governed by the CISG requires new 
considerations.   
 
Importantly, this Article demonstrates a two-step approach to the 
analysis of penalty clauses: 1) whether the sum in question is penal 
in nature, and 2) if so, whether the CISG determines the fate of the 
penalty clause by reference to its general principles.  Considering 
new international developments, this Article argues that such 
clauses should generally be enforced.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd,1 the Australian Court considered whether late payment fees 
are unenforceable penalty clauses.  Importantly, the decision 
demonstrates that the Australian definition and application of 
penalty clauses is different from the English common law, as laid 
out in Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Makdessi.2 Interestingly 
enough, however, the Australian High Court noted: 
 
All of the common law jurisdictions 
are rich sources of comparative law 
whose traditions are worthy of the 
highest respect, particularly those of 
the United Kingdom as the first 
source.  No doubt in a global 
economy convergence, particularly 
in commercial law, is preferable to 
divergence even if harmonisation is 
beyond reach.3 
 
In a landmark decision, the English High Court has similarly 
commented that penalty clauses are “an ancient, haphazardly 
constructed edifice which [have] not weathered well.”4 
 
As such, it is time to revisit the debate surrounding penalty 
clauses in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods,5 which, at this stage, can still be 
termed as ‘unresolved.’  Though divergent between the Australian 
and English legal systems, despite the Australian High Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 
2016) (Austl.).   
2 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 
(appeals taken from Eng.).   
3 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 10.   
4 Cavendish Square Holding BV, [2015] UKSC 67, para. 3.   
5 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, Apr. 1, 
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].   
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noting that convergence is preferable, the common law is currently 
settled.6 
 
In Part I and II, this Article will explore the Australian and 
English positions on penalty clauses and how significantly, if at all, 
they have converged.  Its purpose is twofold.  First, it will explain 
the differences in defining penalties between the Australian and 
English common law.  To that end, the Article will first 
independently analyze how the Australian and English 
jurisprudence define penalty clauses.  The Article will then briefly 
comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches taken 
by the two legal systems.  The purpose of analyzing the two recent 
seminal cases decided by the Australian and English courts, 
Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi, is to see what, 
if anything, the CISG can learn from the recent developments.   
 
In Part III, this Article will revisit the fevered debate 
surrounding the issue of whether penalty clauses are covered by 
the CISG.  First, it will demonstrate that the CISG defines penalty 
clauses.  Second, this Article will show that the ‘validity clause,’ 
contained in Article 4 of the CISG,7 which leaves the enforcement 
of contracts to domestic law, can be overcome.   
 
An added difficulty with the CISG is the fact that it was 
constructed as a compromise between the civil and common law 
systems.  As a result, differences between the two legal systems 
will in some cases present different solutions.  The treatment of 
penalty clauses is a classic example.  Professor Graves, a Professor 
of Law at the Touro College Jacob D. Fushsberg Law Center, put it 
as follows: “The difference between the civil and common law 
treatment of penalty clauses is mirrored in the treatment of 
performance-based remedies in the two legal systems.  The civil 
law treats specific performance as the ordinary remedy for breach, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 10.   
7 CISG, supra note 5, art. 4.   
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while the common law treats specific performance as an 
extraordinary remedy.”8  
 
 The conclusion of this Article will demonstrate that there 
are still significant differences in the treatment of penalty clauses, 
which suggests that a decision of a choice of law is still prudent 
given that a clause considered to be penal in character can be 
declared void and unenforceable.    
II.   THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
In its landmark decision, Paciocco v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“Paciocco”), the Australian High 
Court noted that late payment fees are not a penalty at common 
law.9  The parties did not contest that the late payment fee was 
higher than the actual costs incurred by the bank, and, not 
surprisingly, the Federal Court in 2014 held that the fees were a 
penalty.10  On appeal, the decision of the Federal Court was 
overturned,11 and the Australian High Court affirmed.12  In 
essence, the Court upheld the doctrine of the freedom of contract, 
even in cases where there is uneven bargaining power between 
parties and where a penalty clause is contained in standard form 
contracts.13  Building on Paciocco, this section will discuss the 
Australian definition of a penalty clause.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jack Graves, Penalty Clauses and the CISG, 30 J.L. & COM. 153, 170 
(2012) (citing Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 314, 337 (2005)).   
9 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 
2016) (Austl.).   
10 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd (2014) 309 ALR 249, para. 
25 (Austl.).   
11 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd (2015) 236 FCR 199 
(Austl.).   
12 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28.   
13 Neil Hannan & Nicholas O’Connell, The Bank Fees Case, 
THOMPSON GEER (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://www.tglaw.com.au/corporate/publications/bank-fees-case/.   
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(i)   What is a penalty? 
The question is not new.  In 1915, Lord Dunedin addresed 
the issue of penalty clauses in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v. 
New Garage & Motor Company Ltd. (“Dunlop”).14  Lord Dunedin 
wrote that “[t]he essence of a penalty is a payment of money 
stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party” and that “the 
essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-
estimate of damage.”15  He further added that whether the sum is a 
penalty or liquidated damages depends on the construction of the 
terms used in the contract, and that the penalty must be “judged of 
as at the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of 
the breach.”16  In short, according to Dunlop, when considering 
whether a clause is penal, the first question is whether the agreed 
sum is a fair pre-estimate of the damages.  If it is not, then the 
agreed sum is a penalty and the law relating to penalty clauses 
must be applied to determine its enforceability.  Relying on 
Dunlop and other case law, each Justice in Paciocco found that the 
late payment fee was not a penalty.  Each, however, delivered a 
separate judgment, as detailed below.  
 
In her judgment, Justice Kiefel began by noting Dunlop’s 
distinction between penalty clauses and liquidated damages.17  
Justice Kiefel emphasized the relevance of Dunlop by recognizing 
and accepting that “a sum stipulated for payment on default may 
be intended to protect an interest that is different from, and greater 
than, an interest in compensation for loss caused directly by the 
breach of contract.”18  Discussing the “Dunlop tests,”19 Justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd.  
[1915] AC 79 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
15 Id. at 86 (citing Clydebank Eng’g. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Don Jose 
Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.)).   
16 Id.   
17 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 16 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.) (quoting Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd., [1915] AC 79 
[86]).  
18 Id. para. 26.   
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/4
2017 Penalty Clauses – What Has Changed? 153 
Kiefel further stressed that the distinction between liquidated 
damages and a penalty, while useful, should not be treated as a 
limiting rule.20  Therefore, pre-estimates or sums reflecting other 
kinds of loss or damages are not necessarily penal in nature.   
 
Justice Kiefel also relied heavily on the definition 
propounded by Justices Mason and Deane in Legione v. Hateley, 
which states that “[a] penalty, as its name suggests, is in the nature 
of a punishment for non-observance of a contractual stipulation; it 
consists of the imposition of an additional or different liability 
upon breach of the contractual stipulation.”21  It is this definition of 
a penalty clause that appears to be most acceptable as it was also 
referred to in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd (“Andrews”),22 and, significantly, by the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court in Cavendish Square Holding BV v. 
Makdessi,23 “albeit in a more qualified sense.”24  Notably, both of 
these cases were ad idem that penalty clauses cannot be abolished 
or applied in a restrictive way.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd., [1915] AC 79 [87-88]. To assist in 
the determination of whether a clause in a contract is penal, Lord Dunedin 
offered four tests: 1) whether the “sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach;” 2) whether, when the 
breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, the sum stipulated is a “sum 
greater than the sum which ought to have been paid;” 3) whether “a single lump 
sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or more 
or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious and others but 
trifling damage.” Id. “On the other hand: [4)] [i]t is no obstacle to the sum 
stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the 
breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On 
the contrary, that is just the situation when it is probable that pre-estimated 
damage was the true bargain between the parties.” Id. 
20 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 30. 
21 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 445, para. 32 (Austl.).   
22 Andrews v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, para. 9 
(Austl.).   
23 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67 [para. 31] (appeals taken from Eng.).   
24 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 22 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.). 
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After a thorough analysis of prior case law,25 Justice Kiefel 
reached the conclusion that the common feature in all of the 
jurisprudence is that the sum in question cannot be unconscionable 
or extravagant, but it can “be inferred from the adjectives chosen 
that not every sum in excess of what might be strictly 
compensatory will amount to a penalty.”26  In essence, the sum 
cannot be “out of all proportion.”27  In the case of Mr. Paciocco, 
Justice Kiefel was of the opinion that he failed to establish that the 
late payment fee imposed upon him for his failure to make timely 
payments was a penalty.28 
 
In his judgment, Justice Keane analyzed the penalty claim 
of the plaintiff and noted that “whether a late payment fee is to be 
characterized as an unenforceable penalty is not to be determined 
by asking whether the enforcement of the fee will produce profits, 
even large profits, for the bank.”29  The argument advanced by Mr. 
Paciocco that the late payment fee was a penalty as its purpose was 
to punish him for breaching his contractual obligation by failing to 
make timely payments or to deter him not performing his 
contractual obligation failed.30  Justice Keane reasoned that “the 
late payment fee is readily characterized by the purpose of 
ensuring that [the bank’s] revenues are maintained at the level of 
profitability required by its shareholders.”31 
 
Justice Keane explained that, to maintain a level of 
profitability demanded by shareholders, the bank uses interest 
payments and late payment fees to generate revenue.32  The point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Clydebank Eng’g. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.); Forrest & 
Barr v.  Henderson et. al., [1869] 7 SLR 112 (Scot.); Hungerfords v Walker 
(1989) 171 CLR 125 (Austl.); Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Austl Pty Ltd (2005) 224 
CLR 656 (Austl.).  
26 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, paras. 52-53. 
27 Id. para. 57.   
28 Id. para. 69.   
29 Id. para. 215.   
30 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 215 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.). 
31 Id. para. 216.   
32 Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/4
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illustrated that late payment fees are not confined solely to 
reimburse the bank for direct expenses.  Instead, they also 
contribute to the institution’s revenue stream.33  Judge Keane also 
observed that “an agreed provision avoids the uncertainty and 
expense of litigation.  The benefit of such a provision to both 
parties and to the legal system is obvious.”34  The amount in 
Paciocco was not “extravagant and unconscionable . . . in 
comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be 
proved.”35  Judge Keane also noted that “in Australia, no 
legislation authorises the application by the courts of a standard of 
reasonableness to determine the lawfulness of bank charges,” 
although it was not an argument that Mr. Paciocco advanced.36   
 
In yet another separate opinion, Justice Gageler explained 
in detail the development of penalty causes in the English law and 
the treatment of the maxim developed in Dunlop: whether “the 
sum agreed was commensurate with the interest protected by the 
bargain.”37  Justice Gageler also referred to Andrews, noting that 
the term ‘penalty’ applies to a “punishment, consisting of the 
imposition of an additional or different contractual liability for 
non-observance of a ‘primary’ contractual stipulation.”38  “Thus, a 
penalty is a ‘collateral’ stipulation ‘in the nature of a security for 
and in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.’”39 
 
Importantly, Justice Gageler noted that “Andrews did 
nothing to disturb the settled understanding in Australia that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Id.   
34 Id. para. 284.   
35 Id. para. 306 (quoting Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New 
Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79 [87] (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)).   
36 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 214 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.). 
37 Id. para. 142 (quoting Andrews v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd (2012) 
247 CLR 205, at 236 [75] (Austl.)).   
38 Id. para. 118 (citing Andrews, (2012) 247 CLR 205, at 216 [9], 
referring to Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at 445 (Austl.)).    
39 Id. (quoting Andrews, (2012) 247 CLR 205, at 216 [10]). 
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contractual provision imposing a penalty is unenforceable at 
common law without the discretionary intervention of equity.”40  
 
Lastly, relying on prior case law Justice Nettle noted: 
 
As will be apparent from the 
differences between the approach of 
the primary judge and the reasoning 
of the Full Court, the outcome of the 
penalty appeal turns to a large extent 
on whether this case should be 
regarded as one of the straight 
forward kind in which the Dunlop 
tests are ‘perfectly adequate’ to 
resolve the issues or, whether it 
should be seen as one of the more 
complex types of cases referred to in 
Cavendish which necessitate 
considerations beyond a comparison 
of the agreed sum and the amount of 
recoverable damages. 41 
 
In conclusion, in some cases, there are broader issues that 
need to be protected and they are not directly quantifiable.  This 
raises the question of whether a penalty clause can even be 
defined.  Stated differently, if a court relies on the Dunlop tests, 
which of the four must be applied?  Or, should a court consider all 
of them?  As Judge Nettle observed, positions on penalty clauses 
have changed since Dunlop as it is now “possible to recover 
unliquidated damages for the breach of an obligation to pay a 
specified sum and, accordingly, the amount recoverable for the 
breach of such an obligation is no longer necessarily capable of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Id. para. 122 (quoting Andrews, (2012) 247 CLR 205, at 216 [10]).  
41 Id. para. 322 (citing Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El 
Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 [para. 32] (appeals taken from Eng.)).   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/4
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exact pre-estimation.”42  Simply put, the question now is whether a 
“late payment fee [is] extravagant and unconscionable or out of all 
proportion to the amount which would be recoverable as 
unliquidated damages.”43  
Lastly, it is worth noting that in Andrews, the High Court 
held that the penalty doctrine is not confined to obligations arising 
from a breach of contract.44  Because Paciocco dealt with a breach 
of contract, the Australian High Court did not engage in a 
discussion of that part of the Andrews ruling.45 
III.  THE ENGLISH POSITION 
Both Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi 
and ParkingEye Limited v. Beavis (“Cavendish”) “raise[d] an issue 
which has not been considered by the Supreme Court or by the 
House of Lords for a century, namely the principles underlying the 
law relating to contractual penalty clauses, or, as we will call it, the 
penalty rule.”46  In their joint judgment, Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption began by noting that the penalty rule in England is “an 
ancient, haphazardly constructed edifice which has not weathered 
well.”47  At the same time, however, the Court stated that the 
distinction between a genuine pre-estimate of damages and a 
penalty clause has “remained fundamental to the modern law, as it 
is currently understood.  The question of whether a damages clause 
is a penalty falls to be decided as a matter of construction . . . .”48 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 337 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.) (citing Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125 
(Austl.)).   
43 Id. para. 347.   
44 Andrews v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205 
(Austl.).   
45 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 120. 
46 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67 [para. 1] (appeals taken from Eng.).   
47 Id. para. 3.   
48 Id. para. 9.   
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(i)   What is a penalty? 
In Cavendish, The House of Lords cited to Scandinavian 
Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The 
Scaptrade), in which Lord Diplock noted: 
 
The classic form of penalty clause is 
one which provides that upon breach 
of a primary obligation under the 
contract a secondary obligation shall 
arise on the part of the party in 
breach to pay to the other party a 
sum of money which does not 
represent a genuine pre-estimate of 
any loss likely to be sustained by 
him as the result of the breach of 
primary obligation but is 
substantially in excess of that sum.  
The classic form of relief against 
such a penalty clause has been to 
refuse to give effect to it, but to 
award the common law measure of 
damages for the breach of primary 
obligation instead.49 
Lord Diplock’s statement, however, failed to answer two important 
questions that Cavendish discussed in detail.  First, what are the 
circumstances under which a penalty clause is enlivened?  Second, 
what makes a contractual provision penal? 
 
 In Cave ndish, the House of Lords held that a penalty 
provision operates only upon a breach of contract and only in 
circumstances where the damage “bears little or no relationship to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Cavendish Square Holding BV, [2015] UKSC 67, para. 9 (quoting 
Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 
AC 694 [702] (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)).   
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the loss actually suffered by the plaintiff.”50  The difficulty, 
however, exists in properly distinguishing between a genuine 
penalty clause and an onerous, or commercially imprudent, 
bargain.  English courts have already recognized this problem.  
Both in England and Australia, however, courts have always held 
that absent certain circumstances, such as penalty clauses, 
contractual terms must be respected.   
 
The more complicated question to answer is what makes a 
contractual provision penal.  The House of Lords referred to two 
landmark decisions, Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co. v. 
Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda (“Clydebank”) and 
Dunlop.51  Interestingly, the Lords noted that the four tests 
formulated by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop unfortunately: 
 
[A]chieved the status of a quasi-
statutory code in the subsequent case 
law.  Some of the many decisions on 
the validity of damages clauses are 
little more than a detailed exegesis or 
application of his four tests with a 
view to discovering whether the 
clause in issue can be brought within 
one or more of them.52    
 
The House of Lords added that “the law relating to penalties has 
become the prisoner of artificial categorisation.”53   
 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the true test is 
“whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See id. para. 12 (quoting Exp. Credits Guar. Dep't v. Universal Oil 
Prod. Co. [1983] 1 WLR [399] (Gr. Brit.)).   
51 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67 [para.  19] (appeals taken from Eng.) (citing Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. 
v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79 (HL) (appeal taken from 
Eng.); Clydebank Eng’g. & Shipbldg. Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.)).   
52 Id. para. 22.   
53 Id. para. 31.   
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imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to 
any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of 
the primary obligation.”54  As such, the question is not whether the 
challenged contractual provision is a pre-estimate of the loss, but 
whether it is penal.  As already mentioned above, the High Court 
held that only a detriment imposed on a breach of contract can 
amount to a penalty,55 and, as such, declined to follow the 
Australian holding laid out in Andrews.56 
(ii)   The discussion 
 
It is important to understand the difference between the 
Australian and English treatment of penalty clauses, especially 
considering the fact that both courts relied on the same major 
precedents yet reached different conclusions.  The Australian High 
Court followed Andrews, whereas the House of Lords was 
emphatic in their disagreement with the scope of the law, 
describing the decision as “a radical departure from the previous 
understanding of the law.”57  In addition, Cavendish held that the 
rule against penalties was confined to cases arising out of 
contractual breach, whereas Justice Kiefel in Paciocco stated that 
rulings on penalty clauses are not restricted to breaches of 
contract.58  Importantly, in Paciocco, the Court specifically noted 
that even if the sum in question—a late payment fee—is more than 
the cost, it is not a penalty, because the bank is expected to make 
legitimate profits for its expectant shareholders.59  
 
Despite these convergent views, a better understanding of 
what constitutes a penalty clause has been achieved by both 
jurisdictions.  It has been clearly stated that a fixed sum can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Id. para. 32.   
55 Id. para. 12. 
56 Id. paras. 41-42.   
57 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28, para. 216 
(27 July 2016) (Austl.); Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi 
[2015] UKSC 67 [para. 41] (appeals taken from Eng.).   
58 Cavendish Square Holding BV, [2015] UKSC 67, para. 12; Paciocco, 
[2016] HCA 28, para. 120.   
59 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 30.   
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higher than the actual cost as the question of legitimate profits 
must be considered.60  The phrase “unconscionable and 
extravagant” is used in both of the legal systems to describe a 
penalty clause.61 What is considered to be “unconscionable and 
extravagant,” however, has not been defined but instead appears to 
be left to an interpretation of the facts of each case.  Lastly, it 
seems that the “Dunlop tests” are still regarded as adequate, 
despite comments in Cavendish to the contrary.62   
IV.  THE CISG POSITION  
In Cavendish, and arguably in Australia, the Court 
observed that the modern penalty rule is substantive in nature, and 
not procedural.63  If the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) is the governing law 
in a particular jurisdiction, then the question of whether a sum is 
penal in nature must be determined by the CISG.  Both Paciocco 
and Cavendish stand for the proposition that a pre-determined 
amount of money, which becomes due in the event of a breach of a 
contract, even if higher than actual costs, is not necessarily penal.64  
It is the duty of a court or tribunal to determine its nature.  
 
It has been established long ago at common law that penal 
clauses are unenforceable,65 and the issue was not discussed in 
neither Cavendish nor Paciocco.  The more important and more 
difficult question to answer is whether the CISG governs penalty 
clauses at all.  From the outset, it must be noted that several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Id. para. 15.   
61 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 29; Cavendish Square Holding BV, 
[2015] UKSC 67, para. 31.   
62 Paciocco, [2016] HCA 28, para. 29; Cavendish Square Holding BV, 
[2015] UKSC 67, para. 25.   
63 Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67 [para. 42] (appeals taken from Eng.).   
64 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 
2016) (Austl.); Cavendish Square Holding BV, [2015] UKSC 67.   
65 See, e.g., DILAN THAMPAPILLAI, VIVI TAN & CLAUDIO BOZZI, 
CONTRACT LAW TEXT AND CASES 504 (2012).   
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authors have argued that penalty clauses are not governed by the 
CISG because its Article 4 states that the Convention does not 
apply to the “validity of the contract or any of its provisions.”66  
This presupposes both that the CISG does not govern the issue of 
penalty clauses and that the otherwise governing law, such as the 
common law, declares penalty clauses void.   
 
First, this Article will demonstrate that the CISG does 
determine whether a contractual term is penal in nature.  The 
determination of whether a sum is penal under the CISG is so 
interlinked with how a court or tribunal resolves this issue under 
otherwise governing law that recourse to domestic law is not 
needed.  If the CISG governs, the question of whether a fixed sum 
is penal can be determined by its four corners, more specifically its 
Articles 8 and 74.67  Second, this Article will address whether the 
CISG has the relevant remedies to manage such clauses without 
having to refer to domestic law.   
 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the CISG governs only 
the sale of goods. Any issues with penalty clauses, therefore, can 
only be linked to a breach of contract.  In this aspect, the CISG 
follows the English model, and not the Australian one.   
(i)   Is the sum penal? 
As mentioned above, the answer to the question of whether 
a sum is penal must be found within the four corners of the CISG.  
The remedies for breach of contract by the buyer or seller have one 
common factor applicable to this issue, noted in Article 45 for the 
buyer and Article 61 for the seller.68  Both Articles allow the 
aggrieved party to claim damages, as set out in Articles 74 through 
77.69  In addition, Articles 45 and 61 state that the aggrieved party 
“is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 CISG, supra note 5, art. 4.   
67 Id. arts. 8, 74.  
68 Id. arts. 45, 61.   
69 Id. arts. 45, 61, 74-77.   
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exercising his right to other remedies.”70 The prime solution, 
therefore, must lay within Articles 74 through 77.  Article 74 notes 
that: 
 
Damages for breach of contract by 
one party consist of a sum equal to 
the loss, including loss of profit, 
suffered by the other party as a 
consequence of the breach.  Such 
damages may not exceed the loss 
which the party in breach foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, in the 
light of the facts and matters of 
which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of 
the breach of contract.71 
 
In brief, a court or tribunal is limited to award damages that 
do not exceed the actual loss, including loss of profit.  This is a 
factual a determination.  If the amount due upon a breach is 
predetermined and is more than the actual damages, it can 
potentially be classified as penal.  However, it should also be noted 
that courts and tribunals, similarly to common law courts, can 
determine the relevant profit margin.  Even if the fixed sum is 
more than the actual damages, the issue of the relevant profit 
calculation will allow a court a discretionary solution based on the 
evidence.   
 
The second part of Article 74 causes some controversies.  It 
notes that the damages cannot exceed the loss the party in breach 
foresaw at the conclusion of the contract.72  If, however, a 
predetermined sum has been included into the contract, then it may 
have been foreseeable.  Article 8 allows courts and tribunals to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. arts. 45, 61.   
71 Id. art. 74.   
72 Id.  
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consider parties’ conduct to ascertain their intent.73  The 
application of a party’s in breach intent allows a court or tribunal 
to determine whether the consequences of a breach were 
foreseeable. In sum, taking Articles 8 and 74 into account, the 
CISG is perfectly capable of determining whether a sum is penal. 
 
A decision by the Austrian Supreme Court is instructive on 
this point.74  Damages in that case exceeded the price of the goods 
considerably.75  The abstract of the case notes in brief that Article 
74 follows the principle of foreseeability and full compensation 
and, as such, all losses that were foreseeable at the conclusion of 
the contract ought to be compensated.76  More specifically, the 
Austrian Supreme Court held that: 
 
The obligor must reckon with the 
consequences that a reasonable 
person in his situation (Art. 8(2) 
CISG) would have foreseen 
considering the particular 
circumstances of the case.  Whether 
he actually did foresee this is as 
insignificant as whether there was 
fault.  Yet, subjective risk evaluation 
cannot be completely ignored: if the 
obligor knows that a breach of 
contract would produce unusual or 
unusually high losses, then these 
consequences are imputable to him.77 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Id. art. 8. 
74 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jan. 14, 2002, 7 Ob 
301/01t (Austria), translated in CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF 
INT’L COM. L. 2007, translation at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020114a3.html.   
75 Id.   
76 Id.   
77 Id.   
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As demonstrated, the concept of good faith and the general 
principle of reasonableness, not the fact that a sum exceeds the 
actual calculation of damages, allows courts and tribunals to decide 
whether a fixed sum is penal in nature.  This reasoning is in line 
with the ruling in Paciocco.78  Whether a term is “unconscionable 
and extravagant” should be the deciding factor in the determination 
of a clause’s nature.   
(ii)   The discussion 
As discussed above, courts and tribunals ought to 
determine whether a fixed sum is penal in nature, pursuant to 
Article 8, which allows the consideration of parties’ intent, and the 
first sentence of Article 74, which, again, states that “[d]amages 
for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a 
consequence of the breach.”79  This indeed means that “damages 
must not place the aggrieved party in a better position that it would 
have enjoyed had the contract been properly performed.”80  Courts, 
however, are well equipped to determine whether the damages 
place the aggrieved party in a better position or whether they equal 
to the loss of profit suffered.  Opinions may diverge as to whether 
the CISG governs penalty clauses, but not as to whether courts and 
tribunals ought to determine whether the fixed sum is penal in 
nature, as this determination is substantive, and not procedural in 
nature. The general principles of the CISG—good faith and 
reasonableness—will aid them in that determination.  Just because 
a contract notes a fixed sum, it is not automatically placed outside 
the sphere of the CISG.   
 
Both the Australian and English cases discussed above 
struggled to explain the character of a penalty clause.  Relying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Paciocco v Austl & NZ Banking Grp Ltd [2016] HCA 28 (27 July 
2016) (Austl.).   
79 CISG, supra note 5, arts. 8, 74.   
80 John Y.  Gotanda, Calculation of Damages Under CISG Article 74, 
para. 9 (Opinion No. 6) (last visited Aug. 30, 2017), http://cisgw3.law.pace.  
edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.   
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entirely on domestic law, each of the two jurisdictions took a 
similar, but not identical, path to resolve the question.  It is 
untenable to argue that the determination between a sum being 
either a proper calculation of damages or a penalty clause is not 
clearly within the mandate of the CISG.  Both Professor Graves 
and Hatchem81 did not differentiate between the two important but 
distinct steps: the determination of the existence of a penalty clause 
and, secondly, the effect of a sum that is deemed to be penal.    
 
It is this second step—what happens after a court or 
tribunal determines that the damages are penal in nature—that has 
led to a vigorous debate.  Separate challenges have been mounted 
by both Pascal Hachem82 and Bruno Zeller83 in relation to the 
validity of penalty clauses, with both suggesting that it can be 
determined by reference to the general principles of the CISG.  
 
Professor Graves correctly notes that once Article 4 comes 
into play, the issue as to the effect of a penalty clause must be 
governed by the otherwise applicable domestic law because Article 
4 delegates questions of validly to domestic law.84  This reasoning 
is based on the common law system, and not the civil law system.  
In contrast to common law, German and French law do not declare 
a penalty clause invalid.85  As such, Article 4 is not enlivened.  The 
question then becomes whether the CISG governs penalty clauses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Since 2016, Pascal Hatchem is an Associate at the Bär & Karrer Law 
Firm in Switzerland.   
82 Pascal Hachem, Fixed Sums in CISG Contracts, 13 VINDOBONA J. 
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 217, 221–22 (2009) [hereinafter Hachem, Fixed Sums]; 
Pascal Hachem, Agreed Sums in CISG Contracts, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 140, 145 
(2011).   
83 Bruno Zeller, Penalty Clauses: Are They Governed by the CISG?, 23 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 1 (2011).   
84 CISG, supra note 5, art. 4 (“In particular, except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) the validity 
of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage . . . .”); Graves, supra 
note 8, at 157.   
85 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], arts. 340-41, 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.pdf (Ger.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL 
CODE] arts. 1226-33 (Fr.). 
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when the French and German law is the otherwise governing law, 
or whether penalty clauses as such are not covered within the four 
corners of the CISG.  Professor Graves has partially answered this 
question by noting that if a clause is valid, the CISG would 
arguably govern such a clause under Article 7(1) and its mandate 
to “promote uniformity;”86 however, if the clause is invalid, the use 
of Article 7(1) “seems premature.”87  Professor Graves reasons as 
follows:  
 
[The CISG] does not expressly 
address fixed sums [either as 
liquidated damages or penalty 
clauses].  While CISG Article 6 
grants the parties the autonomy to 
agree upon the payment of fixed 
sums in the event of breach, CISG 
Article 4 relegates questions of the 
“validity” of such an agreement to 
domestic national law.88 
 
Article 4 does indeed state that “except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Convention, [this Convention] is not 
concerned with the validity of a contract or any of its provisions.”89  
At the same time, however, Article 4’s phrase “except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Convention” limits this ‘validity 
exception’ “irrespective of whether [the issue] is characterized 
under domestic law as a question of validity.”90  In addition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Graves, supra note 8, at 165; CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(1). 
87 Graves, supra note 8, at 165.   
88 Id. at 155.   
89 CISG, supra note 5, art. 4(a).   
90 Graves, supra note 8, at 157 (citing Milena Djordjevic, Declaration 
of Price Reduction under the CISG: Much Ado About Nothing?, in UN 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 69, 69, ¶ 
15 (Kroll, Mistelis & Viscasillas eds., 2011)).   
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Article 4 must be interpreted autonomously, and as Professor 
Schlechtriem91 succinctly noted: 
 
What amounts to invalidity has to be 
analysed . . . “autonomously” i.e., as 
a concept of the CISG interpreted 
according to the guidelines of Article 
7(1).  In order to preserve or achieve 
a uniform application of the term 
“validity,” it is not the words used in 
domestic law and their interpretation 
under domestic law, but the 
functions of the respective rules and 
provisions that are decisive.92 
 
Article 4 and its recourse to domestic law will not apply if 
the CISG provides a “functionally adequate solution” to the 
problem. The second sentence of Article 74, which states that the 
damages cannot exceed “the loss which the party foresaw or ought 
to have foreseen,”93 with Article 8, which allows courts and 
tribunals to consider parties’ conduct to ascertain their intent,94 
supply such a “functionally adequate solution.”  In order to 
determine what was foreseen by the parties prior to the conclusion 
of the contract, Article 8 must be consulted to see whether the 
party in breach knew the consequences of the breach.  In 
conclusion, there will not be a gap in the CISG and Article 4 will 
not come into play.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Professor Schlechtriem was a leading scholar on the CISG and a 
Professor at the Freiburg University in Germany.   
92 COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 65-66 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 
2d ed. 2005).   
93 CISG, supra note 5, art. 74.   
94 Id. art. 8. 
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Professor Graves does argue that the “functionally adequate 
solution,” as argued in this paper and prior work,95 is incorrect.  In 
brief, he reasons that: 
 
This test provides a means of 
determining whether the issue falls 
within the phrase “except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this 
Convention,” and is therefore 
governed by the Convention directly.  
In searching for a “functional 
equivalent” solution regarding any 
issues raised by penalty clauses, 
Zeller points us to Article 74.  Zeller 
focuses on the second sentence of 
Article 74—the foreseeability 
limitation—seemingly to argue that 
Article 74 at least impliedly provides 
for enforcement of penalty clauses, 
because such a clause is foreseeable, 
as an express provision of the 
parties’ agreement.  However, this 
arguably amounts to the use of the 
“tail” (foreseeability) to “wag the 
dog” (compensation for the 
aggrieved party’s expectation 
damages).  Instead, one should begin 
any analysis of Article 74 with its 
first sentence.96 
 
Referring to the autonomy principle in Article 6,97 
Professor Graves also notes that “the parties may certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Zeller, supra note 83, at 8.  
96 Graves, supra note 8, at 161.   
97 CISG, supra note 5, art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application 
of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of 
any of its provisions.”). 
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derogate from the default rule of Article 74, providing for 
expectation damages, and, instead, fix a penal sum in the event of a 
breach.”98  Professor Graves is correct to state that party autonomy 
is limited and cannot overrule illegal contracts, as otherwise 
applicable law would not enforce the contract for public policy 
reasons.99  However, the point is that a validity of a term—penalty 
clauses in this instance—does not affect the enforcement of a 
contract.  The determination of whether a contract is valid is left to 
the governing law.  As an example, a contract is valid under the 
CISG without consideration.100  At common law, such a contract is 
invalid.101   
(iii)  The jurisprudence 
If the foreseeability principle extends to losses that exceed 
the value of the contract, it will also extend to any other 
contractual clauses dealing with damages, including fixed sums.  
Article 8, in conjunction with Article 74, support this assertion.102  
This view is also in line with the Australian and English 
jurisprudence on penalty clauses.   
 
Apart from Russia, a search of international CISG 
jurisprudence on penalty clauses does not provide many results.  A 
notable exception is Romania v. Netherlands where the arbitrator 
of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, citing to Article 53 of the CISG,103 which confirms the 
obligations by the buyer, noted that the seller was entitled to 
recover the penalty set forth in the contract.104 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Graves, supra note 8, at 164.   
99 Id. at 164-65.   
100 CISG, supra note 5, arts. 12-24.   
101 THAMPAPILLAI, TAN & BOZZI, supra note 65, at 69-86.   
102 CISG, supra note 5, arts. 8, 74.   
103 Id. art. 53.   
104 Romania v. Netherlands, Case No. 8247, ¶ 11 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 
1996).   
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 In Russia, courts are found to enforce penalty clauses by 
generally stating that “losses should be settled in accordance with 
the provisions of Art. 394 Civil Code, according to which losses 
should be recovered in the part not covered by the penalty.  In the 
present case, these losses of [seller] are compensated by the sum of 
the recovered penalty.”105  In effect, Russian courts are 
commenting that “a penalty constitutes a guarantee of the 
fulfilment of the obligation for the compensation of the creditor’s 
losses,” but, again, the penalty cannot be out of proportion.106 
Russian courts will allow payment of penalties reasoning that: 
 
Vienna Convention does not regulate 
questions on recovery of penalties, 
however, it does not deprive the 
parties to an international sale and 
purchase contract of the possibility 
to reach an agreement on payment of 
a contract penalty.  This sort of 
agreement on payment of contract 
penalties is to be regulated by the 
subsidiary applicable Russian civil 
legislation.107 
 
One point is not in dispute.  The CISG—like any other 
system—can, and must decide, whether a damages clause is penal.  
Because it is a matter of construction, such determination is made 
entirely within the four corners of the CISG.  Both Article 8 and 
Article 4, which states that the scope of the Convention covers the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Russia v. United States, No. 165/2001, Arbitration Proceeding, 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry [Trib. Int’l Com. Arb. Rus. Fed. Cham. of 
Comm. & Indus.], ¶ 1 (Feb. 18, 2002), translation at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020218r1.html.   
106 Russia v. Germany, No. 134/2002, Arbitration Proceeding, Trib. 
Int’l Com. Arb. Rus. Fed. Cham. of Comm. & Indus., ¶ 1 (April 3, 2003), 
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030404r1.html.   
107 Russian Federation Arbitration Proceeding, No. 115/2003, Trib. 
Int’l Com. Arb. Rus. Fed. Cham. of Comm. & Indus. (April 20, 2004), 
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040420r1.html.   
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entire contract, including its formation and the rights and 
obligations of the parties, are of importance.108  Penal clauses can 
be classified as such rights and obligations emanating from a 
contract.   
 
As mentioned previously, in German and French law, the 
question of validity does not eventuate.109  As such, the CISG is 
perfectly capable of resolving the issue of penalty clauses.  As seen 
above, Russia represents a “halfway house between the common-
law system and the civil law system.”110  If the CISG can resolve 
the issue of penalty clauses when German or French law is the 
governing law, then why does Article 4 of the CISG111 not allow 
this same outcome in common law cases, as well?  Recall what 
Professor Schlechtriem said: 
 
What amounts to invalidity has to be 
analysed . . . “autonomously” i.e., as 
a concept of the CISG interpreted 
according to the guidelines of Article 
7(1).  In order to preserve or achieve 
a uniform application of the term 
“validity,” it is not the words used in 
domestic law and their interpretation 
under domestic law, but the 
functions of the respective rules and 
provisions that are decisive.112 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 CISG, supra note 5, arts. 4, 8.   
109 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], arts. 340-41, 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.pdf (Ger.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL 
CODE] arts. 1226-33 (Fr.). 
110 Russian Federation Arbitration Proceeding, No. 115/2003, Trib. 
Int’l Com.  Arb. Rus. Fed. Cham. of Comm.  & Indus. (April 20, 2004), 
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040420r1.html.   
111 CISG, supra note 5, art. 4.    
112 COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 65-66 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 
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In effect, Article 7’s goal to “promote uniformity” in the 
application of the CISG has not yet been reached.113    
 
Arguments have surfaced that the validity exception ought 
to be reconsidered.114  However, as already discussed at length at 
various conferences, the Swiss Proposal has been rejected because 
the CISG as a convention cannot be amended.115  That would mean 
a creation of a new convention, resulting in two separate ones, 
which is not desirable.116  Further, “[t]here is a risk that a global 
undertaking to revise and to expand the CISG could have a chilling 
effect on further action by states to ratify or accede to the 1980 
instrument.”117  In the same vein, a protocol to the CISG that 
would define validity is equally impossible.118  What is possible is 
to take a global view and follow the mandate of Article 7 to 
“promote uniformity.”  
V.   CONCLUSION 
Common law jurisprudence did not address the validity of 
penalty clauses.  That issue, however, is settled law.  What is new 
is the definition of what constitutes a penalty clause in the first 
place.  In effect, that definition has been narrowed.  As 
demonstrated, however, the two seminal cases from Australia and 
England are not in complete agreement.   
 
With respect to the CISG, Professor Graves was correct to 
argue that the ‘validity exception’ of Article 4 of the CISG, if 
applicable, would suggest that the CISG does not govern the effect 
of penalty clauses in common law countries.  The determination of 
whether a clause is penal, however, rests within the CISG.  Many 
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114 See, e.g., Jadranka Petrovic et al., The Exclusion of the Validity of 
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civil law countries, on the other hand, do not declare penalty 
clauses as void.  Article 4 and its recourse to domestic law do not 
apply, however, because the CISG provides a “functionally 
adequate solution” through its Articles 8 and 74. In effect, this 
brings the CISG one step closer to its Article 7’s mandate to 
“promote uniformity.” 
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